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IN THE SUPRF.MF COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATF OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vHARLEY E. WILLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with first-degree murder in
violation of Utah Code
the

Ann.~

71'-5-202,

1953, as amended,

in

shooting death of Dan Okelberry on November 20, 1982.

Pursuant

to a plea arrangement,

the charge was amended to

second-degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann.
<;<:; 76-5-203 and 76-2-202,

1953,

as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On May 19, 1983, appellant pled guilty to the
amended charge before the Honorable Allen. B. Sorensen in the
Fourth Judicial District Court

in and for Utah County.

Sorensen imposed sentence that

same day of an

term of five years to life

indeterminate

in the Utah State Prison, an

additional year under Utah Code Ann.<> 70-3-203(1)

to run

consecutively and an additional term of five years under
Ii;

76-3-203(1)

Judge

to run consecutively.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the sentence imposed
by the court below.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 19, 1983, Appellant waived his right to a
preliminary hearing and indicated a desire to enter a plea of
guilty to the amended information (R. 99, 121).

The court

heard testimony fran two psychiatrists, or. Phillip Washhurn
and Dr. Delbert Pearson, about appellant's competency for the
purpose of showing he was not psychotic, that he unde rs to od
the nature of the charges and was able to aid
defense ( R. 100, 101, 109).

in his own

Roth experts stated that

appellant was not psychotic and was able to understand and aid
in his defense (R. 107-108, 111).

Thereafter, the court found

appellant competent to stand trial and granted leave to
withdraw the not guilty plea previously entered (R. 114, 121).
Appellant entered a plea of

gu~lty

to the charge of

second-degree murder stating that he aided his father in
killing Dan Okleberry (R. 122, 126).

The court found the

guilty plea to be voluntary (R. 126) after questioning
appellant on whether he received promises or threats inducing
the guilty plea (R. 124).

Appellant stated that he also

received no promises concerning the sentence he would be given
on the charge (R. 124-125).
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Prior to sentencing appellant, the lower court
explained to him the possible penalty for second-degree murder
and

the enhancement penalties of an additional one year to run

consecutively plus up to five additional years to run
consecutively (R.

123).

Appellant acknowledged understanding

the possible penalties and entered no objection to their
imposition at any time (R.

123).

Appellant waived a presentence investigation and
requested

immediate sentencing (R. 127).

The Court sentenced

appellant on May 19, l9R3 imposing both enhancement penalties
( R.

1 29) •

No objections were raised by appellant at the time

of sentencing as to the propriety of the sentence imposed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANT MAKF:S NO
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD SUPPORTING HIS
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In state v. Tucker, Utah, F,57 P.2d 755 (1982)

I

this

Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in part due to the
appellant's failure to make any reference to the record in his
statement of the facts:

-3-

A separate and independent basis for
the affirrnance of the trial court is that
the defendant failed to refer to any
portion of the record that factually
supports his content ions on appeal.
Th is
Court will assume the correctness of the
judgment below if counsel on appeal does
not comply with the requirements of Rule
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil
procedure, as to making a concise
statement of facts and citation of the
pages in the record where they are
supported.
Id. at 756-757, citing Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 1/.1 IJtah 359,
242 P.2d 297 (1957).

see also State v. Vigil, Utah, 661 P.2d

947, 948 (1983); State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 2S2, 253
( 1983).
Appellant fails to refer to the record to support
any of his factual statements.

Thus, he has violated Rule 75

(p)(2) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial
court's judgment should be affirmed.

POINT II
APPELLANT WAIVED THE ISSUE OF AN IMPROPER
SENTENCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT AT TRIAL.
After appellant entered his guilty plea, Judge
Sorensen explained the possible penalties for second-degree
murder, including the enhancement penalties under
§

76-3-203( l).

The transcript reveals the following exhange:

THE COURT:

you understand Mr. Willett that the
penalty for this offense can be from
five years to life in the Utah State
Prison?

-4-

MR.

HARLEY WILLETT:

THE COIJPT:

MR.

(R.

And that it can be enhanced with an
additional one year to run
consecutively?

HARLEY WILLE TT:

THP COURT:

MR.

yes I do.

yes.

And it may be enhanced to have an
additional sentence of up to five years
to run consecutively?

HARLEY WILLETT:

122-123).

Yes.

Thereafter, appellant waived preparation of a

presentence report and chose to have sentence imposed
irnrned i ately ( R.

127).

The court

both enhancement penalties.

imposed sentence including

Appellant raised no objection to

the enhancement penalties at the time of sentencing, but has
raised the issue for the first time in this appeal.
Court has stated many t irnes,

As this

it is the general rule that

matters raised for the first time on appeal without timely
objection in the

trial court will not be reviewed.

State v.

Mitchell, Utah, 671 P.2d 213, 214 (1983); State v. Steggell,
Utah, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (1983).
for the first time on appeal,

Because this

issue is raised

this Court should not review it

but should consider it waived.
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POINT III
IMPOSITION OF ENHANCEMENT PENALTIES tJNDF,R
76-3-203( l) IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

§

Appellant complains that imposition of hoth
enhancement penalties

under~

76-3-203(1) resulted in his

being twice placed in jeopardy and therefore his sentence was
unconstitutional.

He argues that either one enhancement

penalty or the other may be imposed,

but not both because thP

United States Supreme Court held that imposition of two
enhancement penalties is always improper in Simpson v.
States, 435 U.S.

fi

United

(1977).

Simpson did not,

however,

hold that imposition of

more than one firearms enhancement penalty is always
impermissible.

In that case,

aggravated bank robbery.

the defendant was charqed with

The statute setting out

the

pu-ishment for aggravated bank robhery itself enhanced the
punishment for the commission of the crime using a dangerous
weapon.

The Court held, therefore,

that 'the separate general

statute imposing a firearms enhancement penalty could not also
be invoked against the defendant.

The result was partially

supported by the principle that a specific statute controls

over a more general statute dealing with the same subject
411 U.S. 475, 4fl'l-4'ln

matter.

see Preiser v. Rodriguez,

( 1973).

The Court also stressed that Congress,

-6-

in its

discussions over the federal firearms statute,l explicitly
stated that the statute was not to be used where specific
statutes already provided for an enhanced penalty for use of a
firearm.

Id. at 1/-15.
The Utah

firearms enchancement statute is

distinguishable from the federal firearms statute construed in
Simpson.

Utah Code Ann.

~

76-3-203( 1) states:

A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term as follows:
( 1) In the case of a felony of the first
degree, for a term at [sic] not less than
five years and which may be for life but
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a
facsimile or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted
for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently
The wording of the Utah statute explicitly authorizes
imposition of both a one year mandatory t.erm and up to a five
year discretionary term.

The united States Supreme court

recently held that multiple sentences do not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause where a statute clearly authorizes

1 18 u.s.C. § 924(c) provides in part:
"Whoever . • uses
a firearm .
. or carries a firearm unlawfully during the
commission of any felony .
. shall, in addition to the
punishment providerl for the commission of such felony, be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year
nor more than ten years."

-7-

cumulative punishments.

s.ct.

673 (1983).

Missouri v.

Hunter,

11.s.

, l

()3

"[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more

than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended."

Id. at 678.

also, Government of Virgin Islands v. Soto, 71R

Seu

F.2d 72 ( lrl

Cir. 1983).
There is no conflict here as

in Simpson between a

general statute and a specific statute both providing
punishment for the same offense.

Here,

there is only one

statute, the clear import of which is to allow discretionary
cumulative punishments for the use of a firearm.

Th is Court

must construe a statute "according to the fair import of

fits]

terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the
law."

It

Utah Code Ann.!; 76-1-106 (1978).

is a longstanding

rule of statutory construction that reviewing courts defer to
the evident purpose of the Legislature to attain a certain
end.

State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, ?6 P.2d 'l55 (1933).

Additionally,

in determining this legisla.tive intent, courts

should consider the purposes sought to be accomplished through
enactment of a particular statute.
P.2d 794 (1977).

State v. Helm, Utah, 563

Insuring proper effect to legislative intent

and purpose is a primary consideration.
Production,
397 (1980);

Parson Asphalt

Inc. v. Utah state Tax Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.

( 1980) .

-8-

Utah, 609 P. 2d 934

The purpose of

~

76-3-203(1) is to impose an

additional penalty on defendants who use a firearm in the
commission of a crime and to increase that penalty where the
circumstances of the crime suggest a more stringent sentence
is appropriate.
§

76-3-203( 1)

Clearly the Legislature in the case of

intended that the trial court be left with

disc ret ion to impose an additional enhancement penalty in
appropriate cases.

Nothing in the wording of the section sets

forth an intent to prohihit cumulative punishments.
reason,

For this

imposition of a discretionary cumulative penalty is

not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Hunter, 103

S.Ct. at 673.
Appellant does not assert that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing the second enhancement
penalty.

Even if that were an issue in this case, this Court

will not overturn a sentence that is within the statutory
scheme unless it is clearly excessive or a clear abuse of
discretion.
(197R).

State v. Gerrard, Utah, 584 p.2d 885, 887-888

No such showing has been made in this case.

The

trial court's sentence should, therefore, be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Appellant

raises the issue of double jeopardy for

the first time on appeal and, therefore, has waived the issue,
A separate ground for summary af firmance

is that appellant

failed to cite to the transcript to support his statement of
facts.
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Even if this Court reaches the double jeopardy
claim, appellant's sentence should be affirmed because the
imposition of a second enhancement penalty was clearly
contemplated by the Legislature and thus is not violative of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/~;;zfday

of June,

lq84.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

'-£~ fir'--

J. STEPHEN MIKITA
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid to Michael D.

Esplin,

attorney for appellant, P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 841'03, this

~of

June, 1984.
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